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JURISDICTION UNDER 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343 DOES NOT INCLUDE STATUTORILY
BASED CLAIMS OF WELFARE RIGHTS DEPRIVATION-
CHAPMAN V. HOUSTON WELFARE RIGHTS
ORGANIZATION
Individuals deprived of welfare benefits by state agencies frequently seek
redress of their grievances in federal courts. States enjoy wide flexibility in
the implementation of federal welfare programs, I and state regulations are
often less generous than the governing federal statute. 2 Accordingly, wel-
fare recipients alleging improper benefit reduction or termination often seek
federal jurisdiction to avoid any inherent state court bias in favor of state
law. 3 Individuals claiming benefit deprivation due to parsimonious state
programs that conflict with more generous federal welfare law, however,
have found federal original jurisdiction elusive. ' In Chapman v. Houston
Welfare Rights Organization, 5 the United States Supreme Court further lim-
ited federal jurisdiction over such claims by holding that welfare rights
granted by federal statute are outside the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1343.6
1. Welfare programs are "basically voluntary and States have traditionally been at liberty to
pay as little or as much as they choose." Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 408 (1970). Further,
the states have the "undisputed power to set the level of benefits and the standard of need."
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 334 (1968).
2. The state's implementing regulations may not contravene Social Security Act provisions
or valid HEW regulations. Harding v. Kurco, Inc., 603 F.2d 813 (10th Cir. 1979). Accord, King
v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). Nevertheless, welfare programs are a "scheme of cooperative
federalism," id. at 316, and federal law gives each state great latitude in dispensing available
funds. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 478 (1970). Further, a state is free to participate in
one, several, or all of the federal categorical assistance programs, as it chooses. Jefferson v.
Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972). Thus, in Quern v. Mandley, 436 U.S. 725 (1978), the
Supreme Court upheld an Illinois Emergency Assistance program of much narrower scope than
that provided in the federal program, 42 U.S.C. § 606(e)(1) (1976).
3. State bias is discussed in note 9 infra.
4. See generally Cole, Federal Jurisdiction Under Section 1343, 3 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
220 (1970); Cover, Establishing Federal Jurisdiction in Actions Brought to Vindicate Statutory
(Federal) Rights When no Violation of Constitutional Rights are Alleged, 2 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 5 (1969); Herzer, Federal Jurisdiction Over Statutorily-Based Welfare Claims, 6 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. [ (1970) [hereinafter cited as Federal Jurisdiction]; Note, Federal Jurisdic-
tion Over Challenges to State Welfare Programs,. 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Challenges]; Note, 1976 Developments in Welfare Law-Aid to Families with Dependent
Children, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 1050 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Developments]; Note,
1974 Developments in Welfare Law-Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 60 CORNELL L.
REV. 857 (1975); Note, The Outlook for Welfare Litigation in the Federal Courts: Hagans v.
Lavine & Edelman v. Jordan, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 897 (1975).
5. 441 U.S. 600 (1979).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by
law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance,
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This Note analyzes the Supreme Court's rationale for rejecting section
1343-based federal court jurisdiction. The conflicting provisions of section
1343 and the federal statute creating the commonly used cause of action, 42
U.S.C. § 1983, are discussed, and the Supreme Court's refusal to resolve
that conflict is criticized. The Note concludes with a survey of remaining
sources of federal jurisdiction available to welfare claimants who allege that
state law has deprived them of Social Security welfare benefits.
CLAIMANTS' THEORY OF JURISDICTION
Welfare claimants seeking redress of their grievances in federal courts
must surmount two hurdles before attaining judicial consideration of their
claims. They must allege a federally cognizable claim for relief, 7 and they
must satisfy the requirements for federal jurisdiction. 8 The cognizable claim
for relief is usually found in 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1 which creates a civil cause of
action for deprivations of various federal rights under color of state law. 10
regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the
constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal
rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States;
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief tunder any Act of
Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote.
7. Federal courts do not require plaintiffs to allege a "cause of action" in those terms.
Tiedeman v. Local 705, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 180 F.2d 684, 686 (7th Cir. 1950); instead,
they require a statement of a "claim for relief." FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The term "cause of
action", however, continues to be used and is often employed to refer to that which a claim for
relief must allege. See Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 209 F.2d 802, 807 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (claim for
relief must indicate the existence of a cause of action).
8. Upon proper motion, the court may dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. FED. R. Civ. P.
7(b)(1), 12(b). Averments of fact within the complaint are sufficient to entertain arguments, but
if the facts at trial fail to establish a federally cognizable cause of action, the court will dismiss
the action. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963). See also Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678
(1946).
9. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Section 1983 was created by Congress because "by reason of prejudice,
passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise . . . the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights,
privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the
state agencies." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1960). Further, "[t]he very purpose of §
1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the
people's federal rights." Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972). Section 1983 "therefore
offered a uniquely federal remedy against incursions under the claimed authority of state law
upon rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the Nation." Id. at 239.
10. Conduct occurs tinder color of state law if the defendants "were clothed with the author-
ity of the State and were purporting to act thereunder, whether or not the conduct complained
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Deprived claimants thus characterize welfare benefits as "rights" and assert a
section 1983 claim for relief. Jurisdiction, however, is not as readily avail-
able. Federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 133111 is infrequently
available, because welfare claimants rarely introduce claims meeting its
$10,000 minimum amount-in-controversy requirement. To overcome this ob-
stacle, claimants seek jurisdiction with no amount-in-controversy require-
ment. Such jurisdiction may be provided under several federal statutes, 12 of
which 28 U.SC. § 1343(3) and (4) are the most significant to welfare recip-
ients.
Claims relying on section 1343(3) for jurisdiction must be authorized by
law and commenced to redress deprivations of rights "secured by the Con-
stitution . . . or by an Act of Congress providing for equal rights."13 Claims
using section 1343(4) also must be authorized by law, but differ from section
1343(3) claims in that they must be brought to attain relief "under any Act of
Congress providing for the protection of civil rights."' 4  Welfare claimants
unable to assert the deprivation of a constitutional right must base their
claims upon a contention that welfare rights provided by the governing fed-
eral statute are rights within the meaning of section 1343(3) or (4), that is,
rights under an Act of Congress providing for equal or civil rights. The ac-
tion is then "authorized" by section 1983, and federal jurisdiction is con-
ferred by section 1343.
Use of this jurisdictional approach has produced conflicting decisions' 5
and consequent uncertain jurisdictional status. In Chapman, the Supreme
of was authorized or, indeed, even if it was proscribed by state law." Marshall v. Sawyer, 301
F.2d 639, 646 (9th Cir. 1962). Accord, Vazquez v. Ferre, 404 F. Supp. 815, 823 (D.N.J. 1975)
(persistent practice by state officials constitutes action tinder color of state law), citing Adickes v.
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 162-69 (1970). See also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 187; Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111 (1945); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941).
11. 28 U.S.C § 1331 (1976) provides in part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interests
and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States
except that no such sum or value shall be required in any such action brought
against the United States, any agency thereof, or any officer or employee thereof in
his official capacity.
12. See text accompanying notes 135-154 infra.
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976). The section is set out in note 6 supra.
14. Id.
15. The leading case supporting § 1343(3) jurisdiction over statutorily granted welfare rights
is Blue v. Craig, 505 F.2d 830 (4th Cir. 1974). See 1976 Developments, supra note 4, at 1056-
60. The opposite conclusion was reached in Andrews v. Maher, 525 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1975),
and Randall v. Goldmark, 495 F.2d 356 (1st Cir. 1974), and in one of the two decisions leading
to the grant of certiorari in the present case, Gonzalez v. Young, 560 F.2d 160 (3rd Cir. 1977).
The other case leading to the Chapman decision upheld jurisdiction. Houston Welfare Rights
Org. Inc. v. Vowell, 555 F.2d 1219 (5th Cir. 1977). Vowell and Gonzalez are discussed in the
text accompanying notes 18-43 infra. Thus, prior to Chapman, the First, Second, and Fifth
Circuits opposed jurisdiction over statutorily based claims, and the Third and Fourth Circuits
supported such jurisdiction.
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Court, with three justices dissenting, held that joint use of sections 1983 and
1343 does not provide jurisdiction over claims based solely on welfare ben-
efit deprivations resulting from state law conflicts with the Social Security
Act. 16 The Chapman decision also touched upon the conflicting terminol-
ogy of sections 1983 and 1343. The majority of the Court refised to rule on
the meaning of these conflicting provisions. 7
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Chapman court granted certiorari to review the Third Circuit's and
Fifth Circuit's divergent applications of sections 1343 and 1983 in Gonzalez
v. Young' and Houston Welfare Rights Organization, Inc. v. Vowell. 19 In
Gonzalez, petitioner Julia Gonzalez requested emergency assistance funds
from the Hudson County, New Jersey Welfare Board in accordance with the
1967 Social Security Amendments. 20 When the state refused, she brought
suit in district court for damages and injunctive relief. 21 Petitioner based
her claim on the conflict between section 406(e)(1) of the Social Security
Act 22 and the more stringent New Jersey welfare regulation. 23 She alleged
that the narrower New Jersey regulation deprived her of rights secured by
the supremacy clause 24 of the Constitution and rights secured by federal
16. Act of Aug. 14, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397 (1974 & Supp. 1979)). The Act is the primary source of
federal welfare benefits.
17. 441 U.S. at 612. For a discussion of that conflict, see text accompanying notes 82-91
infra.
18. 560 F.2d 160 (3d Cir. 1977).
19. 555 F.2d 1219 (5th Cir. 1977). The party Chapman was substituted for Vowell as a result
of a change in the office of Texas Commissioner of Human Resources.
20. Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub L. No. 90-248, § 206(e)(1), 81 Stat. 893,
(1968) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 606 (1968)). The Emergency Assistance program is fully described
in Quern v. Mandley, 436 U.S. 725 (1978).
21. 441 U.S. at 604-05. Petitioner sought $163 damages and an injunction commanding the
New Jersey Welfare Director to conform the state program to federal standards. Id.
22. Section 406(e)(1) has been codified as 42 U.S.C § 606(e)(1) (1976), and defines the term
"emergency assistance to needy families." Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 408 (1970); Dan-
dridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 478 (1970).
23. 10 N.J. Admin. Code ch. 82, § 5.10 (1969). The Code defines "emergency assistance" so
as to make it available when the eligible unit [a needy child] is in a "state of homelessness," a
stricter requirement than that contained in 42 U.S.C. § 606(e)(1) (1976), allowing assistance
"when such child is without available resources." The New Jersey regulation was approved by
the HEW Secretary. Gonzalez v. Young, 418 F. Supp. 566, 571 (D.N.J. 1976). The conflicting
terms are set out in Gonzalez, id. at 571-72. To obtain relief, any asserted conflict between state
programs and federal law must show a violation of a specific provision of the Social Security Act,
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 541 (1972), since the States have the "undisputed power to
set the level of benefits and the standard of need" for their AFDC programs. King v. Smith,
392 U.S. 309, 334 (1968). Accord, Quern v. Mandley, 436 U.S. 725, 738 (1978); Jefferson v.
Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 at 541; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. at 478; Rosado v. Wyman, 397
U.S. at 408.
24. "This Constitution ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Con-
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laws. 25 Petitioner argued that her claim therefore was authorized by section
1983, and that federal jurisdiction should be conferred pursuant to section
1343(3) or (4). The district court granted jurisdiction without addressing
petitioner's supremacy clause claims and without explaining whether the de-
prived "equal or civil rights" required by section 1343 arose under Section
1983, 26 or under the Social Security Act. 27 Nevertheless, finding no con-
flict between the state regulation and the federal statute, the district court
dismissed the petitioner's complaint. 28
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, concluding that the
district court should not have considered the merits, but should have dis-
missed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. 29 In support of its decision,
the Third Circuit reasoned that jurisdiction could not be asserted under sec-
tion 1331 because the requisite $10,000 amount-in-controversy was not pres-
ent, nor upon section 1983 because that section only fashions a remedy and
is therefore not a jurisdictional statute .30 The court further rejected any
theory that jurisdiction over petitioner's claims could be found pendent to
jurisdiction provided by a constitutional claim, holding that the doctrine of
pendent jurisdiction 3l requires a constitutional issue more substantial than a
claim that the deprived rights are secured by the supremacy clause. 32  The
circuit court concluded by stating that section 1343 is limited to jurisdiction
over deprivations of equal or civil rights, despite the plain language of sec-
tion 1983 creating a broad cause of action for deprivation of any federal
statutorily-granted rights.33 Because deprivations of equal or civil rights
trary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST.' art. VI. Petitioner alleged that the conflict between the
federal and state laws violated rights secured by the supremacy clause. Gonzalez v. Young, 418
F. Supp. at 569. See notes 49-57 and accompanying text infra.
25. 418 F. Supp. at 571.
26. The petitioner contended that Section 1983 is itself an act providing for equal or civil
rights. Id. at 570. This theory is discussed in the text accompanying notes 58-64 infra.
27. 418 F. Supp. at 570. The district court simply stated that the matter had been resolved
by Vazquez v. Ferre, 404 F. Supp. 815 (D.N.J. 1975), motion denied, 410 F. Supp. 1385
(D.N.J. 1975). The Vazquez court held that § 1983 is itself an "Act of Congress providing for
the protection of civil rights." Id. at 824.
28. 418 F. Supp. at 572.
29. Gonzalez v. Young, 560 F. 2d at 169.
30. Id. at 164.
31. See notes 143-154 and accompanying text infra.
32. 560 F.2d at 169.
33. Id. at 168. Several acts have been held to provide equal or civil rights within the mean-
ing of § 1343, including: Fair Housing Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631), Zuch v. Hussey,
394 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (housing discrimination); Wagner-Peyser Act (29 U.S.C.
§§ 49-491), Vazquez v. Ferre, 404 F. Supp. 815 (D.C.N.J. 1975), motion denied, 410 F. Supp.
1385 (D.N.J 1975) (civil rights); Civil Rights Act of 1870 (42 U.S.C. § 1981), Henry v.
Schlesinger, 407 F. Supp. 1179 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (racial discrimination); Civil Rights Act of 1964
(42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2000h-6), Marin City Council v. Marin County Redevelopment Agency, 416
F. Supp. 700 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (racial housing discrimination); Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42
U.S.C. § 1973, 14(b)), Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (voting rights are
within § 1343 (4)); Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 201 et seq. (25 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq.), Crowe v.
Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, Inc., 506 F.2d 1231 (4th Cir. 1974) (due process rights
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were not present in Gonzales, 34 the court ordered dismissal for want of
jurisdiction. 35
In Houston Welfare Rights, the respondent represented a class of recip-
ients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) who share living
quarters with non-dependent relatives, 36 Texas regulations require a reduc-
tion of benefits when a non-dependent person is present in a household. 3
After suffering such a reduction, respondent brought suit in district court
alleging a conflict with section 402(a)(7 )3 8 of the Social Security Act and fed-
eral regulations promulgated thereunder .9 The district court found juris-
diction and upheld the Texas regulations. 40 The Fifth Circuit upheld juris-
diction, but reversed on other grounds, 41 reasoning that section 1983 may
be invoked to protect welfare rights, that section 1983 is an act of Congress
providing for the protection of civil rights within the meaning of section
1343(4),42 and that jurisdiction is therefore conferred under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343(4), which provides jurisdiction for actions seeking relief "under any
act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights." 43
guaranteed by the act). Other acts have been held not to provide equal or civil rights within the
meaning of § 1343, including: Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (20
U.S.C. §§ 241 et seq.), Lopez v. Laginbill, 483 F.2d 486 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 927 (1974); Uniform Relocation Act (42 U.S.C. § 4636 (1976)), Young v. Harder, 361 F.
Snpp. 64, 72 (D. Kan. 1973) (does not provide equal rights); National Environmental Policy Act
(42 U.S.C. §§ 4331 et seq.), Firnhaber v. Lake Pewaukee Sanitary Dist., 409 F. Stpp. 23 (D.
Wis. 1976) (does not provide civil rights); 42 U.S.C. § 1988, Moor v. County of Alameda, 411
U.S. 693 (1973), reh. denied, 412 U.S. 963 (1973) (jurisdictional portion of Civil Rights Act of
1866 does not provide civil rights).
34. 560 F. 2d at 167. Nor (lid the circuit court consider the Social Security Act as providing
equal or civil rights. Id.
35. Id. at 169.
36. 391 F. Supp. at 225. The petitioners were commissioners of the Texas Department of
Human Resources. Id.
37. Id. The regulation provides for a prorata reduction of the recipient's benefits. Houston
Welfare Rights Org., Inc. v. Vowell, 555 F.2d at 1222.
38. 441 U.S. at 607. Section 402(a)(7) has been codified as 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1976). The
code section has been interpreted in specific federal regulations discussed in note 39 infra.
39. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(c), 233.90(a) (1976) (current version at 45 C.F.R.
§§ 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(c), 233.90(a) (1979)). These rules provide that only income actually available on
a regular basis and currently available resources will be considered in establishing financial
eligibility.
40. 391 F. Supp. at 226, 234.
41. 555 F.2d at 1227.
42. Id. at 1221. The Third Circuit in Gonzalez referred to § 1983 as a statute that fashions a
"remedy." 560 F.2d at 164. Section 1983, set out in note 6 supra, specifically provides a claim
under which federal relief may be granted and states that the person depriving rights "shall be
liable to the party injured."




In addressing the conflicting holdings in Gonzalez and Houston Welfare
Rights, the Supreme Court considered three alternative theories of jurisdic-
tion. 44 Each theory required that the cause of action be provided by sec-
tion 1983, and each proposed a different source of the rights required by
sections 1343(3) or (4). The Court considered first whether rights resulting
from federal statutes are "secured by" the supremacy clause of the Constitu-
tion within the meaning of section 1343; 4_ second, whether section 1983
itself secures statutorily-granted rights; 46 and third, whether "rights" pro-
vided by the Social Security Act are "civil" or "equal" rights within the
meaning of sections 1343(3) or (4). 47 The Court's conclusion regarding these
theories disposed of all jurisdictional issues set forth by the welfare claim-
ants. The majority in Chapman therefore exercised judicial restraint and
held that it need not resolve the terminological differences that exist be-
tween sections 1343 and 1983.48
The Supremacy Clause
In the appeal of Gonzalez, petitioners argued that section 1343(3)'s "se-
cured by the Constitution" requirement is satisfied by the supremacy
clause.49 The Supreme Court stated that although the clause is not an in-
dependent source of federal rights, it does secure federal rights by affording
them priority whenever they conflict with state laws.5s The Court then
rejected the argument that the supremacy clause secures federal rights
within the meaning of section 1343(3).
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied heavily upon Swift & Co. v.
Wickhain, 51 and its narrow interpretation of the statute defining three-judge
district court jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 2281.52 Section 2281 required a de-
cision by a three-judge district court in suits attempting to enjoin enforce-
ment of allegedly unconstitutional state statutes. 3 Because every federal
44. 441 U.S. at 612.
45. Id. at 612-15.
46. Id. at 615-20.
47. Id. at 620-23.
48. Id. at 611-12. The differences are discussed in notes 80-92 and accompanying text infra.
49. Brief for Petitioner at 21, Gonzalez v. Young, 441 U.S. 600 (1979).
50. 441 U.S. at 613.
51. 382 U.S. 111 (1965). The appellants in Swift, two meat packing companies, brought suit
in a New York district court to enjoin enforcement of New York regulations that were stricter
than the comparable federal requirements. Id. at 113-14. The appellants contended that the
supremacy clause rendered the state regulation unconstitutional within the meaning of 28
U.S.C. § 2281 (1976), thereby resulting in three-judge district court jurisdiction. Id. at 115.
52. Section 2281 was repealed by Act of August 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119
(1976). Three-judge district jurisdiction is now governed solely by 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1976).
53. 441 U.S. at 613 n.31.
1980]
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court attempt to enjoin a state law depends ultimately on the supremacy
clause, the Court, in Swift, held that language requiring constitutional
grounds is superfluous if the statute applied to all supremacy clause
claims. 54 Noting that section 2281 must be read to exclude some type of
suit, the Swift Court concluded that the phrase "upon the ground of the
unconstitutionality" must signify a congressional intent to confine section
2281 to suits "depending upon a substantive provision of the Constitu-
tion." 5
The Court reasoned similarly in Chapman. If the supremacy clause is held
to secure constitutional rights within the meaning of section 1343(3), federal
jurisdiction will be created over claims arising from every conflict between
state and federal law. The phrase "secured by . . . any Act of Congress pro-
viding for equal rights" is therefore superfluous unless Congress intended
some limitation on federal jurisdiction. 56 The Court thus held that Con-
gress did indeed intend some limitation on jurisdiction, and concluded that
the supremacy clause does not secure rights within the meaning of section
1343(3). 57
Section 1983
The Court next disposed of the argument that section 1983 should be read
as an Act of Congress "providing for equal rights" within the meaning of
section 1343(3) or "providing for the protection of civil rights" within the
meaning of section 1343(4). 53 The Court's rejection of the welfare claimant's
section 1343(3) argument confirmed a line of lower court rulings restricting
the scope of section 1983.59 The Court held that section 1983 does not
provide any substantive rights, equal or otherwise. 60 No matter how broad
or narrow a section 1983 cause of action may be, such breadth does not alter
section 1983's procedural character. The Court noted further that "one can-
not go into court and claim a violation of § 1983-for § 1983 by itself does
not protect anyone against anything," 6 1 thereby definitively eliminating the
54. 382 U.S. at 126.
55. Id. at 127.
56. 441 U.S. at 615.
57. id.
58. Id. at 615-20. Before proceeding to the substance of that argument, the Court refused to
rule on conflicting provisions of §§ 1983 and 1343. Id. at 615-16. See text accompanying notes
80-119 supra.
-59. E.g., Andrews v. Maher, 525 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1975) (§ 1983 does not provide equal or
civil rights within the meaning of § 1343(3) or (4)); McCall v. Shapiro, 416 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.
1969) (§ 1983 does 'not extend to solely monetary claims not related to violation of civil rights);
Wynn v. Indiana State Welfare Dept., 316 F. Supp. 324 (N.D. Ind. 1970) (deprivation of rights
provided by the Social Security Act does not fall within the scope of § 1983).




theory of jurisdiction asserting that section 1983 "provides" rights within the
meaning of section 1343(3).62
Nearly as definitive was the Court's rejection of section 1983 as a statute
providing for the protection of civil rights, within the meaning of section
1343(4). The Court reiterated that "[s]tanding alone, . . . § 1983 does not
provide any substantive rights at all" 6 3 and noted further that there was no
indication of congressional intent to expand existing federal jurisdiction
through section 1343(4).64 Section 1983 therefore provides a claim for re-
lief, but does riot provide equal or civil rights.
The Social Security Act
The final jurisdictional theory rejected by the Court contended that the
Social Security Act 65 may be characterized as an act securing "equal rights"
within section 1343(3) or "civil rights" within section 1343(4). 66 Citing an
analogous Supreme Court decision and several other consistent decisions, 6 7
the Court held that Congress intended those phrases in section 1343 to be
construed narrowly to include only those laws specifically providing equal or
civil rights. 68
The Court primarily followed Georgia v. Rachel, 69 which construed the
phrases "any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens" and "any law
providing for equal rights" in 28 U.S.C., § 1443.70 Section 1443 governs the
62. Id. at 618. See, e.g., 1976 Developments, supra note 4, at 1058-60. Section 1983 was
held to provide the § 1343 right used in Blue v. Craig, 505 F.2d 830, 842 (4th Cir. 1974).
63. 441 U.S. at 618. The Court did not hold that § 1983 does not provide any protection for
civil rights. Creating a civil cause of action for redress of a rights deprivation does provide some
sort of protection. Such protection exists, however, only when another act of Congress grants a
substantive civil right. In such cases, saying that § 1983 provides protection is redundant, be-
cause the act granting the substantive right clearly protects the right within the meaning of
§ 1343(4). Section 1983 need be invoked only when the underlying statute granting the right is
not a civil rights act. Id.
64. Id. at 618. See Note, The Proper Scope of the Civil Rights Acts, 66 HARV. L. REv.
1285, 1291-93 (1953).
65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397 (1976).
66. 441 U.S. at 620.
67. Id. at 621. The Court cited Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966) (analogous to the
Chapman argument, see text accompanying notes 69-78, infra), and listed the following as con-
sistent: Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U.S. 1, 39-40 (1906) (phrase "any law providing for equal
rights of citizens" in § 641 Revised Statutes, does not include non-recognition by state court of a
governor's pardon); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 585 (1896) (denial by court of oppor-
tunity to subpoena witnesses for purpose of showing the inability to obtain a fair and impartial
trial is not within "any law providing for equal rights of citizens" phrase of § 641 Revised
Statutes); New York v. Calamison, 342 F.2d 255, 269, 271 (2d Cir. 1965) (phrase "any law
providing for equal rights" in 28 U.S.C. § 1443 refers to those laws couched in terms of equal-
ity).
68. 441 U.S. at 622-23.
69. 384 U.S. 780 (1966).
70. Section 1443 provides:
Any of the following civil actions or criminal prosecutions, commenced in a State
court may be removed by the defendant to the district court of the United States
for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending:
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removal to federal district court of civil rights cases originally brought in
state courts. That section originated in the Civil Rights Act of 1866,71 and
the phrase "any law providing for ... equal civil rights" first appeared in
the Revised Statutes of 1874.72 In Rachel, the Court concluded that the
terminology was broad in that the statute applied both to existing and future
statutes providing for equal civil rights. 73 The Court found no indication,
however, that the language of the Revised Statute was intended to expand
the kinds of law to which the removal section referred. Instead, the Court
held that Congress intended the phrase only to include laws comparable in
nature to the Civil Rights Act of 1866.74
The circumstances of Chapman posed a problem similar to that resolved
in Rachel. Section 1343 refers to "[Acts] of Congress providing for equal
rights" and "any Act of Congress providing for the protection of Civil
Rights." The former evolved from the Civil Rights Act of 18717' and the
latter from the Civil Rights Act of 19 5 7 . 76  Using reasoning analogous to that
of Rachel, the Chapman Court inferred that Congress did not intend that
the rights mentioned in section 1343 be expanded beyond civil or equal
rights. Because the Social Security Act does not deal with the concept of
"equality" or with the guarantee of "civil rights" as those terms are com-
monly understood, 77 the Court concluded that arguments contending that
the Social Security Act provides rights within the meaning of section 1343
were without merit. 78
Having held that the deprived rights were not secured by the Constitu-
tion, that section 1983 does not secure any rights, and that the Social Se-
curity Act does not secure equal or civil rights, the Court found no basis for
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) or (4), and entered judgment against
the welfare claimants. 7
(1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such
State a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of
the United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction thereof;
(2) For any act under color of authority derived from any law providing for
equal rights, or for refusing to do any act on the ground that it would be
inconsistent with such law.
28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1976) (emphasis added).
71. Act of April 19, 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27 (1868).
72. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. at 789. The original act allowed removal only in cases
alleging deprivation of racial equality guaranteed in the act itself. Id. at 788.
73. Id. at 789.
74. Id. at 790.
75. See note 93 infra.
76. Act of Sept. 9, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, pt. 1II, § 121, 71 Stat. 637 (1957).
77. 441 U.S. at 621,
78. Id. at 623. This holding reversed one of the essential holdings of the Fifth Circuit in
Houston Welfare Rights Org., Inc. v. Vowell, 555 F. 2d 1219 (5th Cir. 1977).




Significantly, the majority opinion did not discuss the conflicting breadths
of sections 1343 and 1983.80 The plain language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is
broader than that of 28 U.S.C. § 1343, creating an apparent conflict. Section
1343 grants original federal jurisdiction to parties deprived of either equal
rights under color of state law or of civil rights, and requires that the action
be "authorized by law." 81 Section 1983 provides that a cause of action shall
exist with personal liability for deprivation of rights secured by the "constitu-
tion and laws," and sections 1983 and 1343 both encompass rights secured or
provided 82 by the Constitution. For deprivation of constitutional rights, sec-
tion 1983 makes the action "authorized by law,"8 3 and either section 1343(3)
or (4) confers federal jurisdiction. The conflict arises when those sections are
applied to statutorily-granted rights, for section 1343(3) provides that the
deprived right may be one secured by "the constitution or by an Act of
Congress providing for equal rights,' 84 and section 1983 contains the
broader statement that the right may be one "secured by the Constitution
and laws." 85 Because both sections originated in the same part of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, 86 and the predecessor to section 1983 was the jurisdic-
tional counterpart of the predecessor to section 1343(3),87 common sense
would seem to dictate that the statutes have a similar, if not identical scope.
Courts and scholars have been unable to determine which rights are de-
scribed by sections 1343(3) and 1983, or whether they are the same rights.
Three different interpretations of the statutes have been advanced: first,
section 1343(3) and section 1983 are both limited to suits founded on depri-
vations of rights secured only by the Constitution and laws providing for
equal rights;8 8 second, both sections encompass suits founded on deprivations
of rights secured by all federal laws; 89 and third, section 1983 encompasses
rights secured by all federal laws, and section 1343(3) is limited to rights
80. Substantial discussion of this issue is contained in the concurring opinions of Justice
White, 441 U.S. at 646 (White, J. concurring) and Justice Powell, id. at 441 (Powell, J. concur-
ring).
81. Section 1343 is set out in note 6 supra.
82. The Court rejected any argument that the phrase "secured by the Constitution" refers
to rights "created" by the Constitution, rather than "protected" by it. 441 U.S. at 613 n.29.
83. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976) requires such authorization. See note 6 supra.
84. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976) (emphasis added). See note 6 supra.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (emphasis added). See note 9 supra.
86. See note 93 infra.
87. The history of §§ 1983 and 1343 is discussed in the text accompanying notes 93-104
infra.
88. This view was adopted by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist in
their concurring opinion. 441 U.S. at 623 (Powell, J., concurring).
89. This view was supported by the dissent of Justices Stewart, Brennan, and Marshall. 441
U.S. at 672 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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secured by laws providing for equal rights. 90 The majority in Chapman
succeeded in defeating all of the welfare claimant's theories of federal juris-
diction without addressing the conflict between sections 1343(3) and 1983, 91
thereby leaving the meaning of these sections subject to variable interpreta-
tion. 92
Historical Basis for Controversy
The Court's exercise of judicial restraint in refusing to resolve the uncer-
tain relative breadths of sections 1983 and 1343(3) added new uncertainty to
the convoluted history of those statutes. Both sections originated in section 1
of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.93 That section created liability for color-of-
state-law deprivations of rights "secured by the constitution," 9 4 and provided
that such suits should be prosecuted in either the district or circuit
courts. 95 In the 1874 congressional codification 9 6 substantive sections were
separated from procedural sections. The Act of 1871 was therefore split into
three parts: section 1979 contained language identical to the present 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and authorized suits to redress deprivations of rights secured
90. This interpretation was advocated in the concurring opinion of Justice White. 441 U.S.
at 646, 649 (White, J., concurring). See text accompanying notes 131-32 infra.
91. 441 U.S. at 612.
92. The dispute does not extend to § 1343(4), because that section's separate origin from
both § 1983 and § 1343(3) allows little, if any, support, for contention that § 1343(4)'s grant of
jurisdiction to secure relief "under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil
rights" is coextensive with § 1983's "and laws" terminology. Nor has § 1343(4) progressed
through the tangled history of revisions that led to the creation of § 1343(3), thus leaving little
room for arguments contrary to the plain language of the statute. See text accompanying notes
93-104 infra. Applicants for jurisdiction will therefore be unable to successfully argue that laws
falling within even the most expansive reading of § 1983 also fall within § 1343(4).
93. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). The act was entitled "An Act to
Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
and for Other Purposes," and provided as follows:
That any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom or usage of any State shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any person within
the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States, shall, any such law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the state to the contrary not-
withstanding, be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress; such proceeding to be prosecuted in the sev-
eral district or circuit courts of the United States.
94. Id.
95. Id. District and circuit courts jointly possessed original jurisdiction until circuit courts
were abolished by the Judicial Code of 1911. See note 101 infra.
96. Codification was undertaken pursuant to authorization granted by Congress in Act of
June 27, 1866, ch. 140, 14 Stat. 74 (1866). The codification was passed into law by the Revision
of Statutes Act of 1874, ch. 333, 18 Stat. pt. 3, 113 (1874). Codification was not undertaken for
the purpose of altering substantive provisions of the federal law. See note 104 infra.
[Vol. 29:883
CHAPMAN
by the "constitution and laws;"97 section 563 provided jurisdiction for dis-
trict courts over deprivations of rights "secured by the Constitution" and
over "any right secured by any law of the United States;" 98 and section 629
provided original jurisdiction for circuit courts over deprivation of rights
"secured by the Constitution" and over "rights secured by any law providing
for equal rights."99  The revisors gave no explanation for the different ter-
minologies. 100
The Judicial Code of 1911101 abolished the original jurisdiction of the cir-
cuit courts and transferred it to the district courts. The terminology that
previously described the circuit court jurisdiction was adopted to describe
the district court jurisdiction-that is, the "providing for equal rights" lan-
guage was adopted. 102 With the exception of renumbering, neither the
substantive nor procedural language has changed since. The revision of 1911
is now reflected in the current section 1343(3). Uncertainty also results from
the fact that the 1874 codified versions are positive laws that repeal and
supersede all previous statutes at large, 103 and further uncertainty results
from the clear congressional intent to leave the laws substantively unchanged
97. Revised Statutes, § 1979, 18 Stat. pt. 1, 347 (1878) (emphasis added).
98. Revised Statutes, § 563(12), 18 Stat. pt. 1, 97 (1878). The section authorized district
court jurisdiction:
Of all suits at law or in equity authorized by law to be brought by any person to
redress the deprivation, under color of any law, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage of any State of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution
of the United States, or of any right secured by any law of the United States to
persons within the Jurisdiction thereof.
99. Revised Statutes, § 629 (16), 18 Stat. pt. 1, 112 (1878) (emphasis added). The section
authorized circuit court jurisdiction:
Of all suits authorized by law to be brought by any person to redress the depriva-
tion, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any
State, of any right, privilege, or immunity, secured by the Constitution of the
United States, or of any rights secured by any law providing for equal rights of
citizens of the United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States.
100. The revisors did explain why they phrased § 629 so as to provide jurisdiction over
deprivations of more than just constitutional rights. 1 Revision of the United States Statutes as
Drafted by the Commissioners Appointed for that Purpose 359 (1872). Their explanation, how-
ever, in no way clarifies the terminological conflict. Justice Powell contended that the revisors
intended their reference to "laws providing for equal rights" in § 629(16) to insure that jurisdic-
tion would be provided over the rights granted by the substantive portions of § 1 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, not over rights guaranteed only by the Constitution. 441 U.S. at 632-33.
The question is clouded, however, by the revisors intent to include within § 629(16) jurisdiction
over both § . of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (1866), and § 16 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1870, 16 Stat. 140 (1870). 441 U.S. at 633. The question is further clouded by the complete
lack of explanation for the broader terminology of § 563(12). 441 U.S. at 633.
101. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 13, § 289, 36 Stat. 1086, 1167 (1911).
102. Id. § 24(14), 36 Stat. at 1092.
103. Revision of Statutes Act of 1874, ch. 333, § 2, 18 Stat. pt. 3, 113 (1874). The revised




during the codification. 1 0 4  The codification and revision process therefore
produced broader terminology in section 1983 than in section 1343(3).
Continuing Uncertainty
Failure to untangle the conflict between sections 1983 and 1343(3) por-
tends indecision beyond the realm of welfare litigation, for section 1983 is a
broad source of federal causes of action.' 0 5 Further, courts have invested
extensive quantities of time in the resolution of tortuously unsettled jurisdic-
tional issues. 106 The questions presented in Chapman offered a suitable,
though admittedly strained, forum for resolution of the uncertain breadth of
sections 1983 and 1343(3). 107 Yet the majority restricted its consideration to
the narrowest dispositive issues available, leaving unresolved the uncertainty
over the statutes that has lasted for nearly a century. 108
Rather than clarifying the statutes' breadth, the Court's decision arguably
complicates it further. Although the Court claimed inability to determine the
ultimate correctness of the arguments on all sides of the issue, lO9 Chapman
clearly suggests some conclusions regarding the scopes of the statutes, open-
ing the door to unforeseen interpretations by lower courts of the breadth of
sections 1983 and 1343(3). 110 The Court explicitly accepted the plain lan-
104. In the debates considering passage of the Revised Statutes, the following conversation
occurred:
Mr. Wood: Will there be anything in this revision of the laws that we have not
already in the Statutes at large?
Mr. Poland: [Chairman of the Committee on Revision] Nothing at least we do not
intend there shall be.
2 CONG. REc. 129 (1873). Justices Powell and Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger, agreed that
no change in the law was intended by Congress. 441 U.S. at 639 (Powell, J., concurring).
105. Section 1983 has been held applicable to: civil rights, Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S.
479 (1965); educational rights, Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); voting rights, Ray v.
Blain, 343 U.S. 214 (1952); rights of mental patients, O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563
(1975); and rights of prisoners, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). See Annot., Supreme
Court's Construction of Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 USCS § 1983) Providing Private Right of
Action for Violation of Federal Rights, 43 L. Ed. 2d 833 (1976).
106. In Andrews v. Maher, 525 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1975), the court noted "the irony ... of
having to spend so much time and effort on questions of jurisdiction when the underlying issues
on the merits are comparatively simple." Id. at 120. Chapman itself is an example of excessive
judicial time spent on jurisdictional questions. In five opinions covering 104 pages, less then 18
pages dealt with the underlying substantive issue.
107. See text accompanying notes 122-28 infra.
108. The controversy dates back to the changes occurring in the Revised Statutes of 1874.
See text accompanying notes 96-99 supra.
109. 441 U.S. at 611-12.
110. An example of prior unforeseen applications resulting from the Court's indecision may be
found in Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939). In Hague, the Court found district court juris-
diction under the predecessors to §§ 1343(3) and 1989, see notes 93-104 supra, over a suit to
enjoin municipal officers from enforcing ordinances forbidding the distribution of printed mat-
ter. The decision contained no majority opinion. With only seven justices deciding, the decision
resulted from three concurring and one dissenting opinion. Left without definitive guidance,
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guage of section 1343(3) requiring that the rights be "secured" by the Con-
stitution or by an Act of Congress providing for equal rights. 111 That posi-
tion is contrary to an interpretation that both sections 1983 and 1343(3) en-
compass suits founded on deprivations of rights secured by all federal laws,
thereby partially resolving the issue 112 that the Court felt unable to resolve.
The issue is still clouded, however, by the presence of two concurring
opinions. Justice White declared that the scope of the rights. encompassed by
either provision could not be determined with confidence unless the evolu-
tions of the statutes were examined, and concluded that the issues in Chap-
man could not be resolved without determining whether the statutes in
question were coextensive. 113 He then settled upon the third interpreta-
tion, 114 prescribing a different breadth for each section. 115 Justices Powell
and Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger, motivated by opposition to Justice
White's conclusion regarding the statutes' breadths, overcame their reluc-
tance to decide the issue 1 16 and advocated the first interpretation that both
sections are limited to rights secured by laws "providing for equal
rights."" ' 7  The dissenting opinion advocated the only interpretation re-
jected by the majority-that both statutes cover rights secured by all federal
laws. 118 Because seven of the justices rendered opinions pointing in at least
three different directions, the eventual outcome of the question of conflicting
provisions is far from certain. 119
lower federal courts focused on the decision of Justice Stone, which created a distinction be-
tween personal and property rights cases, and granted jurisdiction only to the former. 307 U.S.
at 531 (Stone, J., concurring). See, e.g., Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969), where
the court noted that although Justice Stone's construction had been severely criticized, there
was something "essentially right about it." Id. at 565. But see Johnson v. Harder, 438 F.2d 7,
12 (2d Cir. 1971) (treating monetary rights in welfare cases as personal rights to exist in society).
The Supreme Court did not specifically address the personal versus property rights distinction
until Lynch v. Household Fin. Co., 405 U.S. 538 (1972), where the Court explicitly rejected
the distinction, and thus ended thirty years of controversy that could have been avoided with a
definitive ruling in Hague. See Note, The Personal vs. Property Rights Distinction for Federal
Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343: Three Decades of Controversy Made Moot, 22 DEPAUL L.
REv. 413 (1972); Note, Lynch v. Household Finance Corp: Jurisdictional Ramifications, 24
STAN. L. REv. 1134 (1972).
111. 441 U.S. at 618.
112. The Court supported its position by declaring that a coextensive construction of
§ 1343(3) and § 1983 would ignore the intent of Congress to limit § 1343(3)'s scope. 441 U.S. at
616-17. This implies that all coextensive constructions would be expansive, ignoring the possibil-
ity that a coextensive construction may restrict both sections.
113. Id. at 647-48 (White, J., concurring).
114. See text accompanying note 90 supra.
115. Id. at 671-72. Justice White held that § 1983 provides a cause of action for violation of
all federally protected rights, whereas § 1343(3) provides jurisdiction only for rights provided by
the Constitution and laws providing for equal rights. Id. at 674-75.
116. Id. at 623-24.
117. Id. at 623-46.
118. Id. at 674 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
119. That both §§ 1343(3) and 1983 are limited to rights secured by laws providing for equal
rights is the opinion requiring the least expansive interpretation of congressional intent and is
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The Court's failure to determine the breadth of section 1983 also under-
mined the potential for alternative sources of jurisdiction because no federal
action can be successful without first stating a claim upon which relief can be
granted. If section 1983 .does not encompass welfare claims alleging other
than equal or civil rights statutory conflicts (the first interpretation), then
even if federal jurisdiction is conferred by a provision other than section
1343, the action may be dismissed for failing to state a claim. Claimants will
not be regarded as having a federal cause of action unless one is found to be
so granted by the statute creating the welfare entitlement. 120 Determining
the federal jurisdictional status of welfare claimants therefore entails resolu-
tion of section 1983's uncertain scope, that is, a finding of the extent to
which section 1983 creates a cause of action beyond deprivations of equal or
civil rights. 121
The majority's refusal to resolve the statutes' uncertain breadth results
from its clear exercise of judicial restraint. The history of the statutes 122
suggests that no correct decision will be found with satisfactory certainty 123
and implies the need for a "Solomon's decision" firmly delineating the scope
of sections 1983 and 1343(3). Any suggestion that the Court should have
resolved the statutory uncertainty must, however, grapple with the force of
the judicial restraint doctrine, which, though subject to occasional criti-
therefore the interpretation most likely to be favored by strict constructionists in lower courts.
Arguments favoring inclusion of rights granted by all federal laws require the least precise vision
of history, and should therefore be less acceptable, The eventual result is therefore likely to be
either the first or third interpretation. But see B. v. Colvatti, No. 78-2468 (3d Cir. 1979) (the
Third Circuit held that suits under § 1983 are proper to secure compliance with the Social
Security Act, thus implying a broad interpretation of § 1983's "and laws" terminology); Tongol
v. Usery, 601 F.2d 1901 (9th Cir. 1979) (court acknowledged the extensive but inconclusive
discussion of the issue in Chapman, and proceeded to follow the language on the face of the
statute, that is, that § 1983 extends to all federal laws).
120. 441 U.S. at 648 n.6 (White, J., concurring).
121. In early cases, the Supreme Court held that the statute presently embodied in § 1983
refers to civil rights only, Holt v. Indiana Mfg. Co., 176 U.S. 68 (1900), and is inapplicable
where it is merely alleged that state legislation impairs the obligation of a contract, Carter v.
Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317 (1885). An early Supreme Court case also held that § 1983 is not
applicable where the right allegedly deprived was secured by a principle of general law requir-
ing a common carrier to carry, whenever asked, within the general scope of business and for a
reasonable reward. Bowman v. Chicago & N.R.R., 115 U.S. 64 (1895). Later cases have greatly
expanded § 1983's coverage. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 675 (1974), following
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970) (suits in federal court are proper to secure compliance
by states with the provisions of the Social Security Act) (pendent jurisdiction); Lynch v. House-
hold Fin. Co., 405 U.S. 538 (1972) (property rights, as well as personal rights, are protected);
Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966) (under § 1983, police officers are liable for damages
from violations of federal statutory rights). But see Hagens v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 534 (1974)
(expressly reserving decision on whether suits alleging that the Social Security Act provides
rights within the meaning of § 1343(3) may be brought under § 1983).
122. The statute's history is considered in the text accompanying notes 93-104 supra.
123. Justice Powell noted that anyone who ventures into the "thicket" of § 1983's legislative
history will find no clearly marked path to correct statutory interpretation. 441 U.S. at 623-24.
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cism, 124 the Court has followed 125 with few exceptions. The best delineation
of those exceptions may be found in Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 126 where the
Court resolved a non-dispositive statutory conflict. The Swift Court stated
that non-dispositive statutory interpretations are required where previous
decisions have not satisfactorily resolved the meaning of the statutes and
where a potential exists for mischievous consequences to both courts and
litigants. 127 With regard to sections 1343(3) and 1983, there can be little
doubt that previous decisions have not resolved the uncertainty, 128 and
given the likelihood of continued attempts by future claimants to attain
1343(3) jurisdiction when expressing section 1983 claims, the potential for
mischief in the form of unnecessary procedural maneuvering is readily
apparent.
IMPACT AND REMAINING SOURCES OF JURISDICTION
The Chapman opinion reaffirms the Supreme Court's previous restrictive
view of the scope of the supremacy clause expressed in Swift and illuminates
the Court's likely inclination in future welfare rights cases. Strong policy
arguments exist advocating original federal jurisdiction in welfare cases in-
volving state-federal statutory conflicts, 129 and the Court recognized "that
124. One commentator has eloquently criticized judicial restraint:
Whenever the possibility arises that the Supreme Court might act with decisive-
ness to implement any of the guarantees written into the Constitution, this slogan is
wheeled again into the breach and made to serve yet once more. And it has had a
marvelous (and in my view a baleful) efficacy in inhibiting even a prudently re-
strained use of the judicial power to give effect to the deeper policies of our basic
law. It has become the universal hypnotic and tranquilizer, the one sluggish lode-
stone of wisdom, the all-sufficient clew-thread for judicial activity, or, rather, inac-
tivity. It has catalyzed scholars and judges to phrenetic search for theory after
theory, technicality after fine-drawn technicality, on the basis of which the Court
could in the pending case escape clear-cut action, and refer the duty of decision to
another department or to the Void.
A. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 88 (1960).
125. In Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936), Justice Brandeis listed
seven rules of judicial restraint, of which the following is most pertinent:
When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question,. and even if a
serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court
will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which
the question may be avoided.
Id. at 348. See also Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932).
126. 382 U.S. 111 (1965).
127. Id. at 115-16.
128. The uncertainty is described in the text accompanying notes 80-92 supra.
129. In Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970), the Court stated: "It is ... peculiarly part of
the duty [of the federal courts], no less in the welfare field than in other areas of law, to resolve
disputes as to whether federal funds allocated to the states are being expended in consonance
with conditions that Congress has attached to their use." Id. at 423. Congress has recognized a
state court bias against protection of federal rights, see note 6 supra, and much judicial time is
wasted on jurisdictional questions, when aside from the amount-in-controversy, welfare cases
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there is force to claimant's [supremacy clause] argument." 130 That the
Court proceeded to reject federal jurisdiction implies a disapproval of those
policy arguments and a desire to continue federalistic policies of limited orig-
inal jurisdiction, at least with respect to welfare litigation.
The ultimate impact of Chapman on the success of welfare litigants'
ability to establish jurisdiction is uncertain. Justice Stewart suggested that
the decision may have little effect on the availability of federal jurisdic-
tion. 131 Justice White, however, suggested the decision may affect all fed-
eral jurisdiction by limiting the underlying section 1983 cause of action. 132
Regardless, welfare claims based solely on deprivations of statutory rights
have been severely restricted. 133 Determination of whether non-section
1343 jurisdiction will be restricted awaits lower federal court interpretation
of Chapman. Presumably, Chapman is unlikely to cause welfare claimants to
attempt suits in state courts of general jurisdiction, where jurisdiction may
be easily attainable, but the reception hostile. 134 Claimants will more likely
"stretch" those theories of jurisdiction remaining unrestricted by the deci-
sion. For that purpose, two major theories of jurisdiction remain-
constitutional rights deprivation theories using section 1983 and 1343, and
federal question theories using section 1331.
Constitutional Claims
Chapman concerned claims based solely on statutory deprivations of wel-
fare benefits. Litigants asserting a section 1983 constitutional rights action
are thus unaffected by Chapman's restriction of section 1343 jurisdiction.
Successful admission to the federal forum therefore may depend upon the
ability of deprived welfare recipients to state a claim for relief involving a
deprivation of constitutional rights. Such recipients may assert claims with
causes of action founded only in assertions of constitutional rights depriva-
tion, or they may attach their claims to a peripheral constitutional issue
under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. 135 Both types of claims will be
present a clear federal issue, see note 106 supra. See generally Herzer, Federal Jurisdiction
Over Statutorily-Based Welfare Claims, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 9-12 (1970); Com-
ment, Federal Jurisdiction Over Challenges to State Welfare Programs, 72 COLUM. L. REv.
1404 (1972).
130. 441 U.S. at 615.
131. Id. at 675 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 648 n.6. For a discussion of potential impact see text accompanying notes 109-121
supra.
133. Section 1983 claims based on deprivations of constitutional, civil, or equal rights may
still successfully assert § 1343 jurisdiction because Chapman dealt with statutorily granted
rights. 441 U.S. at 602-03.
134. State hostility is discussed in note 9 supra. The cause of action provided by § 1983 is
arguably not limited to federal courts, allowing prosecution of theories identical to that used in
Chapnan in the state courts of general jurisdiction.
135. The doctrine is also referred to as that of ancillary jurisdiction. See note 143 infra.
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discussed below. Because both sections 1343(3) and 1983 refer explicitly to
constitutional rights, the discrepancy between the sections is not significant
in either case.
Claims stating a constitutional cause of action normally assert deprivations
of due process or equal protection. 136 A plaintiff therefore may allege re-
duction or termination of benefits without adequate hearing, 137 or may con-
tend that state regulations prescribe inequitable benefits. 138 Such claims
have been made considerably easier by the Supreme Court's decision in
Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 139 which eliminated the personal ver-
sus property rights distinction'14  and thereby allowed welfare recipients to
claim constitutional protection for monetary welfare rights. 141 Properly stat-
ing a statutory conflict in terms alleging a constitutional rights deprivation is
therefore all that is required for welfare claimants to obtain federal jurisdic-
tion. Claimants, however, usually do not attempt to state the statutory con-
flicts directly as constitutional issues because the statutory conflicts that are
of primary interest to welfare claimants are not themselves constitutional
issues. Instead, claimants generally attempt to attach the statutory claim to a
constitutional issue using a federal court's pendent jurisdiction. 142
Included within the broad subject of constitutional claims are the related
doctrines of pendent and ancillary143 jurisdiction. These doctrines allow fed-
136. See, e.g., Hagens v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974) (assertion that recoupment of prior
unscheduled payments under subsequent AFDC program violated equal protection); Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of AFDC payments without a hearing violates due
process); Greklek v. Toia, 565 F.2d 1259 (2d Cir. 1977) (assertion that state's denial of income
deductions to medically needy persons that state allows to AFDC applicants denies equal pro-
tection); Mandley v. Trainor, 523 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd sub nora. on other grounds,
436 U.S. 725 (1978) (assertion that state emergency assistance programs violated equal protec-
tion clause); Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 415 U.S.
651 (1974) (asserting Illinois Aid to the Aged, Blind, or Disabled program violated equal protec-
tion).
137. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
138. See note 148 supra.
139. 405 U.S. 538 (1972). In Lynch, Household Finance Corp. sued Lynch for non-payment
of a promissory note and garnished her'savings account prior to serving process. The Court held
that there is no distinction between personal and property rights and that Lynch stated a claim
within § 1343(3). Id. at 566.
140. After Hague and until Lynch, jurisdiction under § 1343(3) depended upon an assertion
of the deprivation of a personal, non-economic right. Hague is further discussed in note 110.
supra.
141. 405 U.S. at 522.
142. Examples of this type of claim are given in note 147 infra.
143. The concept of ancillary jurisdiction developed originally to enable federal courts to
decide claims ordinarily confined to state court when either party to a federal controversy as-
serts claims that do not otherwise qualify for federal adjudication. Pendent jurisdiction de-
veloped originally to allow a plaintiff who has both a federally cognizable claim and a state claim
arising out of the same set of facts to assert both claims in federal court against a single defend-
ant. The doctrines have now merged into virtual indistinguishability. See Comment, Pendent
and Ancillary Jurisdiction: Towards a Synthesis of Two Doctrines, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1263
(1975).
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eral court evaluation of issues otherwise outside the court's jurisdiction when
those issues are "attached" to a federally cognizable issue. 144 Welfare
claimants must allege both a federally cognizable claim and a pendent
issue sharing a "common nucleus of operative fact" 146 with the cognizable
claim. Normally, the most clearly cognizable issues are those concerning
deprivation of constitutional rights. Typically, therefore, welfare claimants
assert a due process or an equal protection deprivation theory as the feder-
ally cognizable issue and add a pendent allegation that the state law involved
conflicts with federal law. 147 The decision in Hagens v. Lavine, 148 broadly
applying pendent jurisdiction in the context of a welfare complaint, estab-
lished precedent for comprehensive availability of pendent jurisdiction to
welfare claimants. The constitutional claim need only meet a simple substan-
tiality test: as long as the challenged state law is not "so patently rational as
to require no meaningful [re]consideration," 149 the federal court may' 50 de-
cide the attached pendent issue regardless of the eventual disposition on its
merits of the jurisdiction conferring issue. 151 Pendent jurisdiction is espe-
cially attractive to claimants who have a strong statutory conflict argument
144. The federally cognizable issue is usually a constitutional issue. See, e.g., UMW v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
145. Hagens v. Lavine, 415 U.S. at 536.
146. UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725. See C. WRIGHT, HANDHOOK OF THE LAW OF FED-
ERAL COURTS § 19 (3d ed. 1976).
147. See, e.g., Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575 (1975) (contending state's refusal to grant AFDC
benefits to pregnant women violates due process); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)
(contending state failure to comply with federal time limits denied equal protection); Rosado v.
Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970) (contending that state failure to adjust AFDC benefits to reflect
cost of living changes as required by the Social Security Act denied equal protection); Greklek
v. Toia, 565 F.2d 1259 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 962 (1978) (contending state denial of same
benefits to medically needy persons as granted to AFDC recipients denied equal protection);
Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 944 (1972) (contending that
failure to provide a state hearing prior to benefit reduction or termination denied due process).
148. 415 U.S. 528 (1974). The plaintiff AFDC recipients in Hagens challenged a New York
regulation allowing recoupment of prior nscheduled payments from subsequent AFDC grants.
Plaintiff's pendent claim asserted that the New York regulation conflicted with HEW imple-
menting regulations. The constitutional claim asserted was that the same state regulation de-
prived recipients of equal protection. Id.
149. 415 U.S. at 541. Hagens was followed by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 653 n.1.
Federal courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if they
are "so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit. ... Newburyport
Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U.S. 561, 579 (1904), or "obviously frivolous," Hannis Distill-
ing Co. v. Baltimore, 216 U.S. 285, 288 (1910). Pendent jurisdiction has been questioned as
more ancient than analytically sound," Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. at 404, but "remains the
federal rule,'" Hagens v. Lavine, 415 U.S. at 538.
150. Acceptance of pendent jurisdiction is a matter of discretion with the court after consid-
eration of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants. UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at
726.
151. Hagens v. Lavine, 415 U.S. at 542-43.
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and a less substantial constitutional argument 15 2 because of the time-
honored practice of avoiding a constitutional question where a non-
constitutional ground exists for resolving the case. 153 Claimants therefore
need only introduce a constitutional issue meeting the substantiality test to
attain their desired adjudication of the statutory conflict.
Chapman is likely to encourage the use of pendent jurisdiction because it
eliminated the only other available jurisdictional theory that did not require
a rephrasing of the welfare recipients' claim for relief. 154 Claimants using
pendent jurisdiction thus will be able to assert unchanged their intended
claim that the state regulation fails to provide a congressionally intended
statutory benefit.
Federal Question Jurisdiction
Use of section 1331 jurisdiction allows avoidance of the entire problem
surrounding the equal or civil rights requirement of section 1343 because
the welfare claims at issue clearly arise under the laws of the United
States. 155 Welfare claimants asserting a section 1983156 cause of action find
suits under section 1331 attractive because the supremacy clause probably
affords a favorable resolution of federal-state statutory conflicts. 157 Over-
152. The constitutional claim must be substantial enough to withstand disposition by way of
summary judgment. The yardstick for measuring such substantiality is discussed in note 8
supra.
153. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919). "Considerations of propriety, as well as long
established practice, demand that we refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of an act of
Congress unless obliged to do so in the proper performance of our judicial function, when the
question is raised by a party whose interests entitle him to raise it." hd. at 279. Accord,
Mandley v. Trainor, 523 F.2d at 419.
154. Claimants seeking jurisdiction tinder 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976) need not rephrase their
claim; however, jurisdiction tinder § 1331 is not readily available. Section 1331 jurisdiction is
discussed in the text accompanying notes 155-161 iufra. Recent cases support pendent jurisdic-
tion as the potentially most successful source of welfare jurisdiction. In Shands v. Tull, 602 F.2d
1156 (3d Cir. 1979), the circuit court found jurisdiction under § 1343(3) over a conflict between
New Jersey procedure and HEW regulations pendent to a due process claim. The court in
Shands specifically refused to consider claimant's § 1331 arguments. Id. at 1158. In Kimble v.
Solomon, 599 F.2d 599 (4th Cir. 1979), the same circuit that found § 1343 jurisdiction over
statutorily granted welfare rights in Blue v. Craig, 505 F.2d 830 (4th Cir. 1974); see note 12
supra, refused to overturn a district court's finding of jurisdiction based on Blue, despite Chap-
man's reversal of that case. Instead, the circuit court found pendent jurisdiction available. 599
F.2d at 602 n.2.
155. Claims using § 1331 as a basis for jurisdiction must arise under the Constitution or laws
of the United States. Section 1331 is set out in note 11 supra.
156. This assumes the scope of § 1983 was not reduced by Chapman. See text accompanying
notes 130-131 supra.
157. The statutory conflict must be direct, for example failure to meet the requirements of the
governing federal statute, Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970), or flatly denying assistance to
otherwise eligible recipients, King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). The states, however, have the
undisputed power to set the level of benefits and the standard of need. Id. at 334. See further
discussion of the state's power to set the level of benefits in note 2 supra.
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coming the $10,000 amount-in-controversy requirement, however, looms as
a potentially insurmountable obstacle. Rarely do individual welfare claims
approach $10,000, 158 and class action claimants may not aggregate their in-
dividual claims to attain the $10,000 minimum. 15 Some possibility exists
for welfare claimants to contend that the eventual impact of benefit depriva-
tion will exceed $10,000,160 but the strongest impetus for increased section
1331 jurisdiction over small claims is likely to come, if at all, from congres-
sional action. 161 Unless the $10,000 minimum is lifted, section 1331 juris-
diction is unlikely.
Other Theories of Iurisdiction
In 1976, Congress amended section 1331 to remove the amount-in-
controversy requirement for any action involving a federal question and
brought against the United States or its officials. 162 That section, used with
158. See Comment, Federaljurisdiction over Federal Claims, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 800, 810
(1975).
159. Each plaintiff with a separate and distinct claim in a class action suit must individually
satisfy the minimum jurisdictional amount. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291
(1973). See also Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969). But see New Jersey Welfare Rights
Organization v. Cahill, 483 F.2d 723 (3d Cir. 1973) (allowing aggregation of AFDC claims); Bass
v. Rockefeller, 331 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), appeal dismissed as moot, 464 F.2d 1300 (2d
Cir. 1971) (state reduction of medical assistance to poor persons created an integrated claim of a
common and undivided class, citing Snyder v. Harris). See also United States v. Southern Pac.
Transp. Co., 543 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1976); Ingerson v. Sharp, 423 F. Supp. 139, 142 (D. Mass.
1976).
160. The threatened loss of future welfare payments may be considered for § 1331 purposes.
Randall v. Goldmark, 495 F.2d 356, 360 (1st Cir. 1974). See also Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
Flowers, 330 U.S. 464 (1947); Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Engineermen v.
Pinkston, 293 U.S. 96 (1934); Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U.S. 551 (1913). Indirect damages
and damages that are too speculative do not support jurisdiction. Rosado v. Wyman, 414 F.2d
at 176-77. Possible loss of property rights in a home, or possible loss of its possession, is there-
fore too speculative and is incapable of measurement. Randall v. Goldmark, 495 F.2d at 360.
Nor can psychological damage, Davis v. Shultz, 453 F.2d 497, 502 (3d Cir. 1971) (damages to a
youth's future development), or loss of educational opportunity be measured. Johnson v. New
York State Educ. Dept., 319 F. Supp. 271, 275 (E.DN.Y. 1970), affd, 449 F.2d 371 (2d Cir.
1971), vacated for determination as to mootness, 409 U.S. 75 (1972). But see Marquez v. Har-
din, 339 F. Supp. 1364 (N.D. Cal, 1969) (possible damage resulting from deprivation of school
lunches was not too speculative). See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 34 (1970).
161. The American Law Institute has proposed that the jurisdictional amount requirement be
abolished and that jurisdiction extend to all civil actions "in which the initial pleading sets forth
a substantial claim arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States." ALl
STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 24 (1969).
Some action has been taken in this direction by Congress. In 1978, the House of Representa-
tives passed a resolution providing the suggested jurisdiction. H.R. 9622, 95th Cong., ist Sess.
(1977). See 124 CONG. Rsc. 1553 (1978).
162. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 2, 90 Stat. 2721 (1976).
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or independent of the mandamus provisions of section 1361, 163 provides a
possible, yet speculative, alternative approach to welfare jurisdiction. Using
a mandamus theory, welfare claimants may challenge federal regulations as
inconsistent with the Social Security Act by asserting that federal welfare
officials have failed to provide benefits granted by federal law. 164 Arguably,
claimants may sue the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare for failure to invoke provisions of the Social Security Act that
allow enforcement of federal standards against the states. 165 If federal offi-
cials implement an overly restrictive interpretation of the welfare statutes,
claimants could obtain jurisdiction over a section 1983 cause of action under
the federal official as defendant provision of section 1331.
Neither approach to jurisdiction is likely to see extensive use by welfare
claimants. Although suits asserting non-compliance of federal regulations
with the Social Security Act will encounter no jurisdictional difficulties, they
are of limited utility to welfare claimants, because few benefit deprivations
arise from restrictive federal regulations 1 66 and suits based on state-federal
conflicts usually attempt to establish federal regulations as preferred. 167
163. 28 U.S.C § 1361 (1976) provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or
any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff."
164. Three elements are required for mandamus jurisdiction: (1) a clear right in the plaintiff
to the relief sought; (2) a clear dtty on the part of the defendant to do the act in question; and
(3) no other adequate remedy. Carter v. Seamans, 411 F.2d 767, 773 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 941 (1970). Most courts allow mandamus jurisdiction only after strict adher-
ence to these common law requirements. See, e.g., Peoples v. United States Dep't of Agr., 427
F.2d 561, 565 (1970); Carter v. Seamans, 411 F.2d at 773. At common law, the clear duty must
be ministerial in character, Burnett v. Tolson, 474 F.2d 877, 880 (4th Cir. 1974); however, the
statutory phase "in the nature of mandamus," note 163 supra, has created speculation that the
clear duty need not meet the common law requirement of being a purely ministerial function.
Burnett v. Tolson, 474 F.2d at 880 n.5; City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681, 691 n.8
(7th Cir. 1975). But see Jamieson v. Weinberger, 379 F. Stipp. 28, 34 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (duty
must be a clear, plain ministerial command). Thus, in Jackson v. Weinberger, 407 F. Supp. 792
(W.D.N.Y. 1976), a district court granted mandamus jurisdiction to hear claims that the HEW
secretary failed to comply with 42 U.S.C. § 1302, requiring that the secretary "make and pub-
lish ... rules and regulations, not inconsistent .. " with the Social Security Act. Id. at 796
(emphasis added). Jackson was followed in Caswell v. Califano, 435 F. Supp. 127, 132 (N.D.
Maine 1977) (HEW Secretary has clear duty to perform within a reasonable time and not permit
unreasonable delay of administrative action). See also National Welfare Rights Organization v.
Weinberger, 377 F. Stipp. 861 (D.D.C. 1974); Annot., Construction and Application of 28
U.S.C. § 1361 Conferring on Federal District Courts Original Jurisdiction of Actions in Nature
of Mandamus to Compel Federal Officer, Employee, or Agency to Perform Duty Owed Plaintiff,
13 A.L.R. FED. 145 (1972).
165. 42 U.S.C. § 604 (1976) requires the HEW Secretary to stop payment to states if he or
she finds the state welfare plan fails substantially to comply with required federal provisions.
That there are no cases utilizing this theory of jurisdiction possibly illustrates welfare claimant's
interest in receiving benefits, not halting federal financial support of state plans. Use of § 604 is
briefly discussed in Justice Stewart's dissent. 441 U.S. at 673 n.2 (Stewart, J., dissenting.)
166. Cases asserting non-compliance with federal law are discussed at note 164 supra.
167. The state tendency towards greater restrictions than the federal laws require is discussed
in note 9 supra.
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Suits requesting enforcement of federal standards against state programs face
considerable difficulty in surmounting a clear congressional intent to provide
flexible state implementation of the Social Security Act 168 and must addi-
tionally surmount contentions that the claim is a mere sham to attain federal
jurisdiction. 169
CONCLUSION
After Chapman, federal original jurisdiction is still available over claims
alleging state deprivation of welfare rights. Claimants desiring to bring suits
founded solely on conflicts between state and more generous federals laws
will, however, find their ingenuity taxed in any attempt to express a feder-
ally cognizable cause of action. Few claims will fit within the specialized
requirements of either mandamus jurisdiction or federal question jurisdiction
over suits against federal officials, and only the most bizarre welfare case will
exceed $10,000 in individual damages. Further, any claimant seeking to
found a suit upon a section 1983 cause of action will face the continuing
uncertainty in that section's scope, especially if jurisdiction is sought under
section 1343(3). Pendent jurisdiction is thus the best remaining source of
federal jurisdiction over claimed deprivations of statutorily granted welfare
rights. Claimants therefore will be forced to follow circuitous, and mildly
deceptive, 170 routes to attain adjudication of their clear federal issues in the
federal courts.
J. Allen Riedinger
168. Flexible state implementation is discussed in notes 2 & 157 supra.
169. Averments of fact within the complaint are sufficient for the court to entertain argu-
ments, but if the facts at trial fail to establish a federally cognizable cause of action, the court
will dismiss the action. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963). See also Bell v. Hood, 327
U.S. 678 (1946).
170. The deception results from the federal court's acceptance of a constitutional claim as the
sole basis for jurisdiction, followed by the court's refusal to rule on the constitutional claim
because the case may be disposed of through consideration of a pendent claim otherwise outside
federal court cognizance. See Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575 (1975).
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